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Abstract
This article provides readers with context concerning Trump´s foreign poli-
cy towards Asia Pacific, power fluctuations in the region and the main reasons 
behind them according to statements and forecasts of International Relations 
experts. It addresses Asia Pacific’s current balance of power as it has become 
a controversial topic by demonstrating signs of alteration given Trump´s Asian 
foreign policy and China´s reaction, propelled by American withdrawal from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). Power fluctuations have been 
partially fomented by Trump and also by the consequence of Beijing’s reaction 
in its own favor. China is taking advantage of America’s foreign policy and its 
latent economic takeoff with the purpose of enhancing Chinese positioning 
in the region by acquiring even more power. It is important to clarify that this 
article states that the power balance issue in Asia Pacific relays in two major 
aspects: economic and military power and also in the alliances developed as 
a result of both. The research determined that United States provides allies 
with protection (military power) and China with investment (economic power). 
In addition, power fluctuations are going to be captured through the pre-
sent situation of some countries in the region, countries which have been vi-
sited by Trump so far, aside from China: Japan (visit: November 5-7, 2017), 
South Korea (visit: November 7-8, 2017), Vietnam (visit: November 10-12, 
2017), and the Philippines (visit: November 12-14, 2017). Emphasis on these 
countries relays on the fact that they are the focus of the problem (militarism), 
by being strategic in the reinforcement of dominance in the Asia Pacific re-
gion. Given Trump´s foreign policy, characterized by “America first” slogan, 
American foreign policy became a conundrum, especially for American allies. 
For that reason, Asian Pacific countries are showing symptoms of rapproche-
ment to Beijing. The region´s panorama relies on countries’ efforts to balance 
their relationships with both powers while the region´s power it tries to find its 
balance.
Keywords
American foreign policy; Balance of power; Donald Trump; United States 
of America; China; Asia Pacific.
Resumen
Este artículo proporciona a los lectores un contexto acerca de las fluctua-
ciones de poder en la región Asia Pacífico y las razones principales detrás de 
estas, según declaraciones y pronósticos de expertos en Relaciones Interna-
cionales. El artículo aborda el actual equilibrio de poder de Asia Pacífico, el 
cual se ha convertido en un tema controversial al demostrar signos de altera-
ción dada la política exterior de Trump en Asia y la reacción de China, impul-
sada por la retirada estadounidense del anterior del Acuerdo Transpacífico de 
Cooperación Económica (TPP por sus siglas en inglés). Las fluctuaciones de 
poder han sido fomentadas en parte por el mandato de Trump y también por 
la consecuencia de Pekín reaccionando a su propio favor; China está toman-
do ventaja de la política exterior estadounidense y su latente despegue eco-
nómico, con el propósito de mejorar el posicionamiento chino en la región al 
adquirir aún más poder. Este artículo afirma que el equilibrio de poder en Asia 
Pacífico se basa en dos aspectos principales: el poder económico y militar, 
y también en las alianzas desarrolladas como resultado de ambos. Estados 
Unidos brinda protección a sus aliados (poder militar) mientras China brinda 
inversión (poder económico).
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Adicionalmente, las fluctuaciones de poder se plasmarán por medio de 
la situación actual de algunos países de la región, países que ha visitado 
Trump hasta ahora, aparte de China: Japón (visita: 5 al 7 de noviembre 
de 2017), Corea del Sur (visita: del 7 al 8 de noviembre de 2017), Vietnam 
(visita: del 10 al 12 de noviembre de 2017) y Filipinas (visita: del 12 al 14 de 
noviembre de 2017). El énfasis en estos países se basa en el hecho de que 
son el foco del problema al ser estratégicos para reforzar el dominio en la 
región Asia Pacífico. Dada la política exterior de Trump, caracterizada por 
el lema “América primero”, la política exterior estadounidense se convirtió 
en un enigma, especialmente para sus aliados; por esa razón, los países 
de Asia Pacífico muestran síntomas de acercamiento a Beijing. El panora-
ma de la región se basa en los esfuerzos de los países para equilibrar sus 
relaciones con ambas potencias, mientras que el poder de la región misma 
trata de encontrar el equilibrio.
Palabras clave
Política exterior estadounidense; Balance de poder; Donald Trump; 
Estados Unidos de América; China; Asia Pacífico.
Introduction
Since the Trump administration started in 2017, overall American foreign 
policy has suffered a drastic change. It is yet a foggy strategy that must still 
be defined by scholars and politicians as the mandate matures. What is 
evident about his strategy is that “(…) a new vision will govern... it's going to 
be only America first, America first” as Donald Trump mentions. “America 
First” was a slogan which emerged during Trump s´ campaign; however, 
this phrase is undoubtedly reflected on American foreign policy as United 
States is prioritizing American interests over any region or allies’ interests in 
order to be “(…) responsible for the United States, not the world” as Trump 
states. Referring to Asia, American foreign policy has chosen a route, which 
clearly diverges from previous strategies such as Obama s´ “Asian pivot”, 
or George Bush s´ “preemptive war”. Given the somersault of American 
strategy towards Asia and especially towards Asia Pacific region. Other 
powers such as China are stepping stronger into the picture in other to fulfill 
the holes left behind by Trump. 
This article identifies present power fluctuations in Asia Pacific grounding 
on the region’s most relevant countries, in terms of alliances: Japan, South 
Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines, as they make their way into the power 
balance conflict in Asia Pacific by choosing the best ally between United 
States and China. In order to be able to choose an ally, the countries 
previously mentioned have to take into account their own economic and 
military interests, their historic relationships with both powers and the 
region s´ future. In the meantime, they struggle by balancing their relations 
with both powers whereas United States and China expose their animosity 
between each other. Additionally, the article aims to expose China s´ deterrent 
economic power in Asia Pacific, its present influence on the region, even over 
longtime American allies, and how it is surpassing American dominion given 
United States lack of clearness in its foreign policy. 
In order to do so, the article attempts to describe Trump´ s foreign policy 
towards Asia Pacific by contrasting it with previous American strategies, 
namely by Obama and Bush, in order to provide readers with a 
background. Once the background is clear, the article proceeds to give 
context on American-Asia Pacific and Chinese-Asia Pacific relationship by 
establishing a sort of comparison between past and present relationships 
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among Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines with both powers. 
The purpose of delimiting the changes in the relationship highlights the power 
fluctuations in Asia Pacific. . 
The relevance of this article roots on developing a more comprehensive 
understanding of the present balance of power in the Asia Pacific region, 
and the role of the world superpowers as this situation is a key factor in 
the emergence of future conflicts and rapprochements, therefore being a 
reason for investigation. Additionally, the article contributes with a compila-
tion of chronological news appearing on the daily, which can be analyzed 
in the future in order to mark behavioral patterns of Washington, Beijing 
and the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, forecasts can also be carried out. 
The study is based on a qualitative methodology through the analysis of 
papers, books, and articles of academics, scholars and politicians who 
are experts in American-Asian relations, foreign policy and the Asia Pacific 
region; a process that was also nurtured by current affairs data provided 
by well-known international journals and news portals. The research had 
an important limitation regarding the information available: due to Trump s´ 
recent administration, it is too soon for deeper academic developments 
and for that reason most of the data collected was from articles in journals. 
A chronological glimpse of American foreign policy
As it was previously stated, American foreign policy towards Asia 
made a somersault in comparison with preceding strategies. Back in the 
Bush mandate (2001-2009), The United States’ interests were fully placed 
on the Middle East and European countries. American foreign policy 
had three vertices: democratization, dominance of the Middle East, and 
most importantly, “preemptive war” against terrorism. The last vertex was 
implemented by American government in 2001 after 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
Bush decided to start military action given the imminent threat made by 
Afghanistan, one of the “axis of evil”, according to him. 
Afterward, during Obama s´ presidency (2009-2017), American foreign 
policy transcended, as there was a re-balance of strategies, American 
interests were redirected towards Asia with the “Asian pivot”. American-
Chinese relationship was intensified by American impetus given the 
relevance in their trade relation. Obama s´ administration understood that 
Asia has become the world’s new economic center of gravity, meaning 
the economic center mass of the world (Erdmann, 2014). This indicates 
that global economic power has shifted from the United States to Asia 
forasmuch as Asian countries power has been boosted due to the rapid 
growth of their economies and fast urbanization. In addition, the “Asian 
pivot” was an extension of America s´ military rebalancing. Overall, the 
strategy-benefited United States the most as American economy was 
amplified by helping Asia Pacific to develop its own economy. “Asian pivot” 
permitted United States to promote its economic agenda whilst endorsing 
economic development in the region. 
Nevertheless, since the Trump administration took place, the “Asian 
pivot” was leave to be forgotten in a drawer the day that the American 
president decided to withdraw United States from the TPP, one of the 
most important multilateral agreements with 13,4% of the global economy 
without the US (Pérez et al., 2018). This agreement was composed by 
twelve Pacific economies as a “pathway initiative” from APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation) and was negotiated between 2010 and 2015. On 
February 2017, United States left the TPP behind, due to the fact that, for 
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Trump, the agreement was a “(…) horrible deal” because it would severely 
affect American jobs overseas and additionally, it would be a tool that 
could be used by other country members in order to take advantage of 
United States. Moreover, after the American withdrawal, the agreement was 
transformed into the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership) gathering the eleven remaining countries: 
Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Chile, Canada, Brunei 
Darussalam, Australia, and New Zeeland (Pérez et al., 2018). 
Since Trump s´ presidency took place started in 2017, United States 
started a reduction of its global role. The country has withdrawn from various 
trade partnerships, trade agreement negotiations, defense treaties, and it 
has also shifted from its traditional allies; some scholars have described 
Trump´ strategy as an “offshore rebalancing”. Trump stated that American 
foreign policy should be reduced and only focused on three core national 
interests: “(…) fight against terrorism, renegotiation of trade deals and a 
new emphasis on America’s military power” (Spatafora, 2017).
The present American strategy has a domestic approach instead of an 
international one, contrary to what has been witnessed in the past. This 
strategy makes emphasis on the American middle class, which, according 
to Trump, has been deeply injured by globalization. Given the dramatic 
alteration in the American foreign policy and its fogginess, Trump s´ 
administration is representing “(…) the injection of the highest level of 
uncertainty to be seen in the world order since the end of the Cold War” (Mt. 
Fuji Dialogue). This program also highlights the status of Asian countries, 
which are in a state of anxious waiting given the conundrum in Trump s´ 
foreign policy (Tanaka et al., 2017), which might actually “(…) alter the core 
values and principles of the United States” (Erdmann, 2014). This situation 
has become a risk because Asian countries have to figure out Trump’s 
intentions towards the continent basing on the policies applied to other 
Asian countries such as China and North Korea, as Bridget Welsh stated in 
“Trump’s Foreign Policy in Asia” seminar from “Istituto Affari Internazionali” 
(Spatafora, 2017). 
 S-F / Shutterstock.com
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Trump´ s foreign policy towards Asia
As Trump s´ international political game is being progressively unmasked, 
it has been clear that his administration will make drastic changes regarding 
“(…) many long-standing presumptions about the role of United States in 
the world” (Slaughter & Rapp-Hooper, 2017), which is worrisome, mostly 
for American allies. Since 2017, there is anxiety in the Asian scene, coming 
predominantly from two longtime American allies, Tokyo and Seoul, given 
the “(…) lack of any replacement with a proactive trade policy or economic 
agenda (…)” according to Amy Searight in “President Trump s´ Trip to Asia” 
press conference from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS, 2017). Japan and South Korea present the uppermost interrogates 
given the fact that they are depending on Washington s´ defense (military 
power). Nonetheless, their panorama is still over casted. Arne Westad 
(2016) stated that Beijing has worried also, mainly because of the imposition 
of trade and investment restrictions, Chinese worries core is the country s´ 
economic growth dependency on exports to United States. 
Bridget Welsh (2017) describes Trump s´ foreign policy in Asia, specifically 
in Southeast Asia, as absent, transactional, uncertain and contested (Spatafora, 
2017). For professor Welsh, Trump is giving the impression of not having 
any interest in Southeast Asia, going in the opposite direction to Obama. 
Furthermore, he has not declared his policy towards the South China Sea, 
instead he has been passively withdrawing United States from multilateral 
deals of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), disregarding the 
fact that in the past, the United States has played an active role by promoting 
the share of information, national and regional mechanisms, involvement in 
the East Asia Summit, and former membership of the TPP. Likewise, Trump s´ 
business-style approach is being reflected in his foreign policy. Given his 
past as a successful businessperson and his cabinet s´ power struggle mix 
between conservatives, confrontationists and capitalists’ members, a clear 
strategy is being averted. Moreover, it is veridical to argue that Trump has 
all of his efforts directed to North Korea s´ nuclear development, American 
military presence enlargement, and to mitigate Chinese influence and 
power diffusion across the world, especially in the Asia Pacific region. 
Currently Washington’s behavior regarding bilateral and multilateral 
agreements has Asian countries on the fine line because of the vulnerability 
that they are becoming victims of United States´ presence in the region 
creating a “star network” (Slaughter & Rapp-Hooper, 2017).8 The analogy 
between “Star network” and Asian scenario indicates that Asian countries 
are directly connected to United States, which functions as the region s´ 
“central computer” or center of the system. Moreover, Asian countries are not 
connected among themselves, meaning that any resilience of Washington 
would lead to turmoil and to a possible shutdown. Nevertheless, Victor Cha 
argues that Asian connectivity diffusion will be positive for the region, as it 
will encourage for a new security structure addressed to a multilateral Asia.
Trump´ s foreign policy towards Asia Pacific
Trump s´ foreign policy towards Asia Pacific has two emphases: first, 
reinforcement of American military power and second, reinforcement of 
economic and trade alliances. According to Susan Thornton (2017) during 
a press conference, Trump s´ strategy has abandoned the “Asian pivot” 
(Qing, 2017). Nonetheless, it would not abandon its strategic emphasis on 
Asia Pacific as American government states its enduring commitment “(…) 
based on strategic interests and on shared values” as stated by James Mattis, 
the US Secretary of Defense.
8 “Star network” topology is system regarding 
computers in which all the nodes of a network 
are connected to a central computer, but are 
not connected among each other. A failure on 
the central computer will cause a complete 
shutdown. (Business Dictionary, n.d.)
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Liu Qing enlisted three key features of Trump s´ foreign policy towards 
the region (Qing, 2017); the first is “America First”. In Asia Pacific, Trump has 
been mulish regarding Washington s´ budget directed to American allies’ 
security. He has publicly demanded American allies, Seoul and Tokyo, 
equally share the economic burden from defense spending by monetary 
contributing as prompt as possible. 
Second feature is American quest of peace through strength; Trump 
has managed to increase American military and economic power in Asia 
Pacific in order to secure the United States´ hegemonic dominance and 
he has not hesitated to use that power in favor of American prosperity and 
security.
Nowadays, American power in the region resides on its naval supremacy. 
In the last year, Washington has enlarged its military arsenal, especially 
nuclear weapons, and it is rebuilding the country s´ armed force starting 
by broadening it. James Mattis declared in 2017 that a stability initiative 
in the region would be implemented. The main goal of this initiative is to 
place 60% of American military forces in Asia Pacific by 2020 (Qing, 2017). 
In addition, American president is reiterating and developing Asia Pacific s´ 
military alliances with countries such as South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.
Finally, the third feature is United States´ “issue-oriented” approach as 
Washington is focusing on resolving grand scale problematics on the region 
grounding on Trump s´ priorities. First problematic is Pyongyang s´ crescent 
nuclear development restraint and future denuclearization; presently, if the 
United States is endangered in any shape or form by North Korea, Trump 
will not hesitate to intervene militarily as Pyongyang is a matter of national 
security. Second, the renegotiations of trade agreements as Trump s´ 
administration thinks that trade agreements in Asia Pacific are the cause 
behind American trade deficit and economic regression. He specially 
blames China, as according to Trump s´ point of view, Beijing is a hazard for 
American trade survival and development given the balance of trade. The 
overall result is that Trump is opting for a selective multilateral approach- 
for example American withdrawal of the TPP, and bilateral negotiations- for 
example renegotiations of the FTA with South Korea and future negotiations 
of a FTA with Japan. The third feature is Chinese expansion deterrent.
The future movements of Trump´ s foreign policy 
towards Asia
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Mira Rapp-Hooper have developed diverse 
alternatives for future movements of Trump s´ foreign policy towards Asia. 
The first alternative augurs the total desertion of Obama s´ “Asian pivot”, 
situation that will cause the abandonment of American allies in the region 
(Slaughter & Rapp-Hooper, 2017), consequently leaving Asia in disarray. 
The second alternative is related with the G2 (Group of two), United States 
and China, and dictates that the strategic partnership between Washington 
and Beijing will be strengthen, causing the merge of the world s´ two major 
economies, consequentially, both countries will lead the G209 (Slaughter 
& Rapp-Hooper, 2017). Finally, the third alternative foretells that Trump s´ 
foreign policy towards Asia will be completely attentive to a military strategy 
(Slaughter & Rapp-Hooper, 2017) enforcing American military presence in 
the region. This alternative seems to be the up-to-date movement of United 
States strategy in the Asiatic scenario.
9 Group of twenty which includes: United 
States, China, United Kingdom, Russia, 
Germany, France, Italy, Brazil, Australia, Canada, 
South Korea, India, Argentina, Japan, Turkey, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, 
Mexico, and the European Union.
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American-Chinese relationship during Trump´ s era
United States developed a solid position concerning tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, and exchange rates in Asia Pacific due to, allegedly, American trade 
deficit and economic regression. China is the most affected country in the 
region by this strategy as Trump has devoted itself to progressively imposing 
tariffs to imported Chinese goods. As a result, American-Chinese “tariff war” 
emerged and both powers are imposing barriers to each other goods as 
“tariff retaliation”- “tit-for-tat”. Situation has strongly escalated, hence, nego-
tia tions between both countries´  trade negotiators are taking place.
The last reunion occurred on August 2018 due to American 
administration s´ announcement of “(…) a new round of tariffs on $ 16 billion 
worth of Chinese imports” (Collins, 2018). In the past, there have been 
two tariff waves, the first affected $34 billion in Chinese imports and the 
second included 25% tariff (Collins, 2018); as reprisal China “(…) retaliated 
by slapping an extra 25 percent duty (…)” (Collins, 2018). Hence, financial 
markets in United States have been fluctuating disfavoring American 
companies over all; if this war continues, not only the United States will 
have to bear the costs, but China too.
Analysts like Scott Kennedy and Erin Ennis do not consider possible 
the prompt solution for this war, particularly because Trump has stated that 
negotiations will “(…) take time because China’s done too well for too long, and 
they’ve become spoiled (…) they dealt with people that, frankly, didn’t know 
what they were doing, to allow us to get into this position.” (Wallace, 2018).
It is important to highlight the fact that China already overpasses the 
United States in terms of trade and investment as it has become the first 
commercial partner of almost all the countries of the world and it is the 
first investor and receptor of foreign investment on the planet. Additionally, 
Beijing has become not only an economic threat to United States, but also 
a military one; since 2017, military reforms took place in China in order to 
protect its interests around the world. Presently, Beijing is enlarging its 
military presence in Asia Pacific, emphasizing on its naval power. Chinese 
navy force, People s´ Liberation Army (PLA), passed to be an outdated fleet 
to place China as progressive world leader as it is leading Chinese military 
transformation (Brennan, 2018); “(…) the PLA navy launched two advanced 
warships designed for surface warfare, long-range air defense and anti-
submarine operations, as the country's naval modernization continues 
apace” (Brennan, 2018). In sum, United States and China have become 
worthy adversaries in the region.
Current standing of China in Asia Pacific region
Multiple tensions related to Beijing occur on Asia Pacific, some have 
a deep historical background as Tokyo and Seoul and some are current 
affairs; nevertheless, most tensions are regarding territorial disputes, 
natural resources such as oil and gas, or governmental decisions such as 
Pyongyang. Some countries have a negative opinion towards China as an 
international actor since it appears to be controversial; notwithstanding, 
Beijing has been notorious for being predictable concerning its Asian 
foreign policy by clearly exposing its intensions. At present, Chinese priority 
are Asian countries. Hence, Beijing is thoroughly involved in multilateral 
negotiations such as APEC, TPP, ASEAN and The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (OCS).
There is an Asia Pacific before and after American TPP withdrawal as it 
propelled changes on the region s´ balance of power as China emerged as 
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the, allegedly, strongest power. According to Westad (2016), this situation 
“(…) certainly has the potential for strengthening Beijing’s position (…) it has 
a historic opportunity for redirecting flows of trade and investment to China’s 
advantage”, besides, Ezra Vogel forecasted a scenario where Beijing will 
play “(…) a very positive role in international affairs, somewhat replacing the 
United States”; notwithstanding, “The more likely scenario is that the existing 
trade patterns will continue, including the major role the United States plays 
both as a market and as an investor in Asia” (Westad, 2016).
However, China has the opportunity to fill the “blank space” left by Trump 
in Asian Pacific trade. According to John McCain, American TPP withdrawal 
“(…) create(s) an opening for China to rewrite the economic rules of the road 
at the expense of American workers”, is meaning that China could enforce 
its economic agenda in the region. China is taking this situation as an 
advantage and is playing its “wild-card”, it is offering Asian Pacific countries 
a FTA, namely the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), 
which conveniently exhibit less regulations and restrictive standards in 
comparison to the CPTPP; Beijing is rewriting and renegotiating trades 
and economic relationships. Additionally, China offers the prospect of a 
less protectionist view in order to bargain FTAs in comparison with United 
States who became a difficult party in the renegotiation of American-South 
Korean FTA. Washington s´ “solo game” is turning the table positively for 
China. During Trump s´ mandate, Beijing prioritizes the solidification and 
consolidations of international ties showing a gradual economic and political 
expansion, propelling its foreign policy goals. 
Asia Pacific´ s Balance of Power: Trump vs. China
Philippines
Philippines have been a strong American ally, more important, it has 
been a strategic country which enforces American military presence in Asia 
Pacific given the EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement). It 
is an agreement between United States and Philippines which promotes 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response, maritime domain awareness, 
maritime security, interoperability, strengthening AFP for external defense, 
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and capacity building towards AFP modernization (Department of Foreign 
Affairs-Republic of the Philippines, 2014). In sum, EDCA granted permission 
to United States to have access to Philippine military bases. It was signed 
on 2014. However, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte is known for his 
confrontational approach towards other world leaders. Duterte has taken 
the most drastic approach among all Asian Pacific countries regarding 
foreign policy towards United States. Beforehand, during his candidacy he 
promised that the Philippines would have an independent foreign policy 
from United States and its money. Finally, on October 2016, during his visit 
to China, Duterte announced Manila´ “separation” from Washington. 
Through that visit, Duterte was seeking to improve Manila s´ and Beijing s´ 
relationship, mostly in favor of economic assistance, which apparently is 
more important that Philippine-Chinese territorial dispute for the Spratly 
and Paracel Islands.10 Both countries´ relationship has actually prospered 
given the fact that in the same year China granted the Philippines $24 billion 
destined to investment and loans, a big share of the money was directed 
to infrastructure development. Consequently, Beijing and Manila are new 
friends, situation that is a big progress for China because the Philippines 
are an imperative ally to counteract American military ambition in the region, 
as Rauhala argued (Rauhala, 2017).
Moreover, since Trump is president, Duterte saw the opportunity to 
have a fresh start with United States leaving behind his rocky relationship 
with Obama, but he does not cut his newly strings with China, nor Russia. 
Herman Kraft talking about Philippine divergence between United States 
and China said: “We have a tiny window when we can still play both sides.” 
(Rauhala, 2017).
Japan
Japan has been a historically ally of United States, “(…) U.S.-Japan 
Alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is 
fundamental to regional stability and prosperity” (U.S Department of 
State, 2017). For that reason, back in 2016, “Tokyo proved to be the most 
concerned actor in the Asia Pacific after the November elections (…)” (Dian, 
2017), especially because during Trump s´ presidency campaign, he stated 
that Japan was over relying on United States in order to fund Japanese 
defense by diffusing its budget obligations. Once Trump positioned, 
Japan s´ Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, was the first world leader to meet him. 
After the meeting, Shinzō commented that American president was a leader 
“(…) whom I can have great confidence in.” (Spatafora, 2017) But there is 
uncertainty towards Washington’s fulfillment of the alliance commitments, 
given America s´ unclear strategy. Tokyo is in the middle of a disjunction. 
According to Dian (2017), there are two possible scenarios: on one 
hand, Tokyo can end up in a middle of a confrontation between United 
States and North Korea, in the case that Washington starts a preemptive 
war against Pyongyang. Japan will be immersed in an unwanted conflict 
due to its alliance with United States. On the other hand, Japanese-
American alliance can suffer from desertion by Washington, probably 
due to Trump s´ impulsive movements. Either ways, Japan has leaded 
the communication among Asian Pacific countries and Washington given 
Tokyo s´ dual interests on American engagement in the region. Firstly, 
Japan aims for the continuity of close American-Japanese economic 
and politic relationship. For that reason Tokyo is attentive on preventing, 
though policy making, the closure of American market s´ door by applying 
a vis-à-vis strategy11 by which Japanese policy makers contact personally 
10  Asian islands which are being disputed 
by China, Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, 
Brunei, and Malaysia. 
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American public functionaries in order to convince them that Japan will be a 
favorable partner for United States´ economy and also to prove to them that 
“America First” will be injurious not only for other countries but for United 
States too. Secondly, Japan aims for American presence in Asia Pacific in 
order to restrain China s´ process of becoming the region s´ leading country; 
because of American “uninterested” position, China is progressively taking 
advantage by imposing its dominance. It can be concluded that Tokyo is 
strong-minded about maintaining American-Japanese tight relationship 
because of security and economy.
Chinese-Japanese relationship can be compared with a rollercoaster 
ride, a path full of difficulties. Hemmings and Maiko stated that both countries 
political warmth has been continually disturbed by mini-crises such as 
Senkaku/Diaoyu;12 but this has not prevented the solidification of their 
strong economic bond. Their relationship is based on pure flirtation 
making the international community to ask, “(…) why is their contemporary 
relationship marked by rising political antagonism despite greater economic 
interdependence?” Nevertheless, “Despite geopolitical rivalry and clashes 
over historical narratives and territorial disputes, both countries are 
undeniably economic Siamese twins joined at the hips” (Peng Er, 2017) 
from about 1980s given the “grand bargain.”13 China superposed United 
States and the European Union regarding trade relationship with Japan. 
This economic bond needs to be preserved, and even reinforced, as 
according to Shizō Abe “(…) duties and mission that I must fulfill are pretty 
clear: namely, to regain a strong and robust economy and also to restore 
Japan s´ strong foreign policy capability.”
Nonetheless, a new panorama regarding Chinese-Japanese relationship 
is looming because of a series of encounters between both mandatories. 
On November 2017, a reunion between Shizō and Chinese Prime Minister 
Xi Jinping was held in an APEC meeting in Vietnam. Xi was clear on his 
will to improve their relationship starting by cooperation regarding regional 
integration promotion. Xi mentioned Shizō that differences between both 
countries such as “(…) history, Taiwan, and other major issues of principle 
concerning the political foundation of the China-Japan relations (…)” had to 
be managed together in a “(…) constructive way (…)”. As a conclusion of the 
meeting, Shizō publicly announced: “President Xi stated that the meeting 
represented a new start for Japan-China relations, and I completely agreed”. 
In addition, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has described the changes on the 
relationship as positive. 
Eventually, Tokyo is giving the impression of properly balancing its 
relationship with China and United States; however, it is not clear which will 
be Shizō proceeds. Nonetheless, Tokyo s´ motivation towards foreign policy 
and International Relation is utterly influenced by economy. According to 
Hemmings and Kuroki (2013), Shizō purposes “(…) turning Japan into a 
normal power, one with allies, interests, and hard and soft power”, and for 
that reason, Tokyo has to shape its relationship with other powers. On one 
hand, its relationship with United States has to become equal and balanced. 
On the other hand, its relationship with China has to become stronger, and 
at the same time Tokyo has to inhibit Beijing s´ growth in the region, making 
of Tokyo s´ policy towards China convoluted and nuanced.
South Korea
South Korea and United States build a sturdy relationship since Korean 
War14 by becoming key allies with conjoint goals and values. Both countries 
are bound in military and trade terms by three aspects. First, coordinated 
11  Which means facing in English.
12  Asian islands, which are being disputed 
by Japan, China, and Taiwan. These 
islands possess vast oilfields. 
13  Period during the 80s when Japanese’s 
automobile and appliance industries 
moved their production to Mainland 
China. Japan benefited due to the 
reduction of production costs, labor 
costs. China benefited due to the 
management, investment, technologies, 
and organizational techniques from the 
Japanese (Hemmings & Maiko, 2013).
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North Korean Policy as Washington has been a leading country in terms of 
imposing pressure and economic sanctions on Pyongyang; this has lead 
North Korea to accept a meeting with South Korean president Moon Jae-in. 
Given to this historic milestone which took place in Panmunjom, Moon said: 
“I think President Trump deserves big credit for bringing about the inter-
Korean talks (…) it could be the result of US-led sanctions and pressure.” 
consequently, Trump has acknowledged this credit before the 2018 Winter 
Olympic Games: “If I weren’t involved, they wouldn’t be talking about the 
Olympics right now, they’d be doing no talking.”. This “word exchange” 
can be understood as an attempt to reinforce the relation between Seoul 
and Washington through their common goal, which is North Korean 
denuclearization; South Korean-American relationship is at its best moment 
given their synchrony. Second, the Mutual Defense Treaty which is a treaty 
between both countries signed in 1953 with the purpose of defending each 
other against external armed attacks and enforcing the fabric of peace in the 
Pacific region (Yale Law School, n.d.); and third, the KORUS FTA (U.S.-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement) enhanced in 2012 (Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 2018).
Related to China, on October 2017, Chinese and South Korean govern-
ments announced their countries desire to route their relationship into a 
more positive pathway as both countries have a common interest: North 
Korean denuclearization. However, tensions were rising recently as Seoul 
has adopted aggressive security policies against North Korea due to 
Pyongyang s´ increasingly nuclear power development and threats and 
American influence; South Korea has increased its military cooperation 
with United States and Japan, as consequence Seoul agreed on hosting 
American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). THAAD is an 
American anti-missile system installed on 2017 in South Korea in order to 
intercept North Korean missiles and protect South Korea from them (BBC 
Mundo, 2017). Notwithstanding, Beijing did not welcome in a friendly manner 
Seoul security policies. On the contrary, Beijing proposed the strategy called 
freeze-for-freeze (Chinese strategy to de-escalate the tensions in the Korean 
Peninsula), which dictates that United States and South Korea have to cease 
their joint military efforts in exchange of North Korean ballistic missiles and 
nuclear weapons testing halting (McGuire, 2018) but unfortunately, for China, 
South Korea shared American position by rejecting Chinese effort. The main 
reason behind the proposal rejections is that this strategy will force United 
States and South Korea to cease their joint military efforts. 
Nowadays, Chinese-South Korean tensions are being mitigated because 
both countries stated their aim to normalize their relationship. Seoul showed 
the first step when South Korean Foreign Minister, Kang Kyung-wha, publicly 
declared that South Korea is not going to be part of American missile 
defense network. It will not deploy the THAAD again and will not be part of 
the development of a military alliance with United States and Japan. 
Further improvements were made on December 2017 when Xi and Moon 
meet in Beijing, both mandatories agree on the Four principles to secure 
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula: 
“First, war on the Korean Peninsula can never be tolerated; second, 
the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be firmly 
maintained; third, all issues, including the denuclearization of North Korea, 
will be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations and Fourth, 
improvement in inter-Korean relations will be ultimately helpful in resolving 
issues involving the Korean Peninsula” (Cheong Wa Dae, 2018). 
This collaboration is a fresh start between both Asian countries in which 
prosperity, stability, and peace are the main goals.
14  Military encounter between North and 
South Korean fractions, which took 
place from 1950 to 1953; result was 
the division of Korean peninsula in two: 
North Korea and South Korea. Southern 
fractions were supported by United 
States and Northern ones by China. 
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2018)
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Overall, Seoul is proving respect for Beijing´ security concern and has 
a clear aim to improve Chinese-South Korean relationship, for the good of 
the region. Notwithstanding, South Korea is aligned with United States in 
reference with North Korea. It is important to add that Trump s´ foreign policy 
towards South Korea has been related only to military affairs due to rising 
tensions with Pyongyang. 
Vietnam
On one hand, Vietnam and United States have had a distorted relationship 
where ties were severed a long time ago, but on May 2017, both countries 
moved forward in a mature attempt to construct a strategic relationship 
based on security cooperation; Vietnamese leaders are building a trust-
based naval commitment with Washington. For the first time, since Vietnam 
War15, an American aircraft carrier visited the country; this is the biggest 
military presence that Hanoi has had. It is important to highlight that Vietnam 
is strategic for United States in order to coerce Chinese naval expansion. 
Further, American TPP withdrawal had grave implications for Vietnam given 
its status of “small country”, Hanoi could have propelled its economy by 
having accesses to United States´ domestic market, and unfortunately, the 
opportunity was completely lost. Notwithstanding, Prime Minister of Vietnam, 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc, remained positive regarding the region s´ multilateralism 
by favoring other trade agreements proposals. 
On the other hand, Hanoi´ s relationship with Beijing has been presenting 
tensions given the dispute for South China Sea because China is claiming 
most part of the South China Sea, including maritime territory recognized 
by Vietnam. In this manner, due to American aircraft carrier Hanoi acquire a 
burden, as the situation seems to be an American-Vietnamese pressure on 
Beijing. However, China has remained silent probably because of Hanoi´ s 
fruitful diplomacy. Complexity of Chinese-Vietnamese relationship relays 
on Vietnam s´ aim to sustain a firm relationship with Beijing and Vietnam s´ 
steady position regarding South China Sea, creating a challenging situation, 
which has to be handled through diplomacy. 
Furthermore, Trade between both Asian nations was $93.69 billion worth in 
2017, economist expect that in 2018 year it rise up to $100 billion. Vietnamese 
exports, leaded by phone industry and multiple staple industries, to China 
are augmenting, approximately by 60% in comparison with 2016. Over 
last couple of years Chinese-Vietnamese economic relationship has been 
tightening, which is important because China is Vietnam s´ most important 
trade partner as most of Vietnamese exports are directed to. Hanoi is in need 
of improving its relations with China because its new naval partnership with 
United States will not provide economic advantages given Trump s´ foreign 
policy. Certainly, Vietnam aims for building regional economic alliances but 
American economic status has become weaker in Southeast Asia and its 
support to allies is unreliable. Consequently, Hanoi has to search for other 
trade and investment partners, such as China, which has proven to be a 
reliable prospect. During his visit to China, Vietnamese president Trần Đại 
Quang, publicly encourage Chinese and Vietnamese companies to be more 
innovative and proactive so both countries will engage in a bilateral trade 
agreement in a near future. Quang is in the need for Chinese investment 
in Vietnamese industries related to electronics, logistics, and infrastructure. 
Overall, Vietnam is one of the few Asian countries, whose relationships 
with both, United States and China, were broken. Nevertheless, amendment 
of relationships is needed. Hanoi is in an uncomfortable situation, between 
a rock and a hard place. Current relationship with United States is for 
15 Armed conflict from 1955 to 1975 in which 
communist and American supported 
fractions of Vietnam confronted; North 
Vietnam was communist and South 
Vietnam was supported by United States. 
(CNN, 2018).
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prevention because Hanoi is reacting towards China s´ hostilities due to their 
expansionist demands in the South China Sea, by collaborating with United 
States as a powerful military ally. In terms of security, China managed to push 
Vietnam into American arms. Nevertheless, even if there are pressures, as 
Le Hong Hiep states it can be assumed that “(…) Vietnam will only embrace 
the U.S. at a pace that does not cause an over-reaction from China.” In 
addition, Vietnam embracement of United States will not overthrow the 
country s´ non-alignment policy. 
Conclusion
Trump s´ arrival to the United States administration has indeed redefined 
American foreign policy towards Asia, causing noticeable changes in the 
Asia Pacific strategic scenario. United States foreign policy towards Asia 
has passed from Bush s´ “preemptive war”, to Obama s´ “Asian pivot”, 
and finally, to Trump s´ yet to be defined foreign policy. His “America first” 
prioritizes American interests over other countries´ interests, including allies, 
and portraits an impression of American isolation. Consequently, there is a 
high level of uncertainty in Asia Pacific. Asian countries of the region such 
as South Korea and Japan, long-time American allies, Philippines and 
Vietnam, and even Washington s´ rival, China, are trying to resolve a puzzle 
set by United States president. Trump s´ interest in the region is augmenting; 
nonetheless, his interest remains on security, aiming to increase the 
American military presence in Asia Pacific in order to maintain American 
hegemony. United States efforts in the region are concentrated on North 
Korean denuclearization, American military presence enlargement, and 
China s´ power expansion deterrent. 
Consequently, certitude is being offered by China, and plenty of 
the region s´ countries are responding positively to its economic offer. 
Nevertheless, changes in the region in respect of China are not merely 
attributed to Trump s´ foreign policy. Some Asia Pacific countries have 
changed their behavior towards China because of Beijing s´ material pressure 
and as an attempt to forestall that pressure. Although, most countries in 
the region “(…) value their economic ties with China and do not want to 
be forced to make a strategic choice between Washington and Beijing.” 
(Przystup & Saunders , 2017)
The breaking point for United States was its TPP withdrawal. After 
this situation, Asia Pacific countries do not want to give up on regional 
multilateralism, even if a power like United States takes not part on it. Instead, 
they are moving forward in order to find a new FTA that meets countries´ 
interest the best. Before this goal is reached, Asian Pacific countries’ strategy, 
for the moment, is to enhance their bilateral and multilateral ties in order to 
counteract current changes in the region. It is important to notice that Beijing 
is offering Asia Pacific countries attractive, even “ideal” proposals regarding 
trade, for future bargaining of course. Additionally, Beijing has become the 
most relevant transmitter of foreign investment in the globe, mostly related to 
infrastructure. China is betting all its economic odds in order to position itself 
as the cooperative power of the region.
TPP withdrawal seems to backfire United States in economic and political 
terms; this situation has not only had bad effects in terms of American exports 
of goods and services, foreign investment, and relationship with other 
international players, but has also leveraged Beijing’s global empowerment, 
especially economic. In sum, United States economic, political and security 
influence is shaky, moving slowly towards a black hole of ambiguity. In 
contrast, United States black hole is China s´ shortcut to empower and 
secure its economic and future political agenda in Asia Pacific. 
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It can be stated that Asia Pacific is in the middle crossroad, United States 
is on one side and China on the other; emerging relevant questions are: which 
side is going to be chosen? In addition, by which countries? According to 
Baviera (2017) “Because of Trump, most countries want to hedge their bets 
and remain as flexible as possible (…) and right now, China looks like a more 
stable partner than the U.S.” (Rauhala, 2017). However, Asian countries of 
Asia Pacific such as Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam have not 
adopted a steady decision regarding China and United States yet, given the 
fact that Beijing grants economic growth and Washington offers security but 
power fluctuations are latent as power itself is shifting from vessel. 
Instead of choosing one side, are successively completely rejecting the 
other side. The countries beforehand mentioned are targeting for regional 
equilibrium by gradually collaborating, simultaneously, in various affairs 
with both powers trying to adjust to current Asia Pacific scenario. Like Vogel 
predicted in 2016: “A lot of countries in Asia…now feel there are two big 
powers that they have to power about: United States and China, and they 
will have to adjust to both.”. For Beijing and Washington, present condition 
in Asia Pacific might seem as a zero-sum situation. For others, for example 
Manila, it is a win-win situation because it is possible to meet their interests 
at expense of both powers, while there are racing each other and on the 
search for stable and loyal alliances. 
As a conclusion, instead of becoming victims of vulnerability created 
by Trump s´ foreign policy, and trying to resolve his conundrum, Asian 
countries should focus on building and fortifying the Asian linkage in order 
lose dependence of Washington s´ leadership and resources. They take 
advantage of their own economies by harmonizing Asian countries´ efforts, 
and institutionalize an Asian security net in order to become resilient against 
Trump s´ decision making. However, for the moment, taking advantage of 
America-Chinese power battle seems to be the most convenient strategy, 
again, as long as the battle lasts. 
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